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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 168 
Accident time: 08:30 Accident Date: 19/08/1997 




Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 21/08/1997 
ID original source: NS (date inferred) Name of source: CMAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast Ground condition: hard 
metal fragments 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group operated in a two-man drill whereby one 
deminer used the detector and marked any signals while the other looked for tripwires, cut 
undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. A third deminer may have been resting [it 
is not known whether the group had changed from three-man to two-man teams at this time]. 
1 
Conflicting with the investigation report, this accident is listed on the country MAC Accident 
summary sheet as having occurred on the 18th August 1997. An internal report on the 
accident by the UN controlled demining group (in Khmer) was located at the country MAC. 
The following summarises its content.  
The road had been used by a mining operation  [the other kind] so there were a lot of metal 
fragments in the area, making the Schiebel detectors difficult to use. There had been no rain 
prior to the accident, so the ground was hard. The team had already cleared 5km of the road 
and a large number of mines and IEDs had been found. 
That morning the team was drilled on using detectors in such areas and all detectors were 
tested thoroughly. 
The victim was a prodder man and he and his partner had already cleared about 20m and 
had found about 30 fragments. At 08:30 the victim was returning along the lane after clearing 
some vegetation and trod on a mine that was about 11m into the lane.  
The crater was 21cm wide and 13cm deep which the investigators interpreted as meaning 
that the mine was buried to a depth of about 10cm. The detector was tested and it was found 
that it could detect a Type 72A at 10cm in normal soil, but it could not detect the mine in areas 
with a high level of natural contamination. 
 
Conclusion 
The report concluded that the mine was missed by the detector man because he had 
adjusted his Schiebel to cancel out background readings and this meant that the mine was 
not detectable at that depth. He had been working carefully and according to current SOPs. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the victim should be fully compensated and that the 
SOPs for using a detector in a contaminated area should be re-examined. A different detector 
should be found that could cope with contaminated areas and that all cleared area of this kind 
should be checked again for Type 72a mines with the new detector. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 213 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: US$2,500 Time to hospital: 2 hours 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 





A brief medical report was found but it lacked sketches of the injury [part of the format] and no 
discharge date was given. It recorded that the victim arrived at Mongkul Borey hospital at 
10:30. His left foot was amputated at point 1/3 up on his lower leg. He had no other recorded 
injuries. 
The victim was awarded compensation of US$2,500 on 24th November 1997.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the investigators concluded that the deminers were using a detector that could not do the job, 
and the supply of that detector was a management responsibility. The secondary cause is 
listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
Management secured the funds to replace the detectors shortly thereafter.   
 
Related papers 
The file included a photograph of the victim after treatment (on crutches), photographs of the 
accident site (no context), and a table of the results from a detector trial held on 19th June 
1996 when 15 different detectors were evaluated against a range of mines buried at various 
depths.  
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